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Abstract
Artin’s braid groups have been recently suggested as a new source for
public-key cryptography. In this paper we propose the first undeniable signa-
ture schemes using the conjugacy problem and the decomposition problem in
the braid groups which are believed to be hard problems.
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1 Introduction
Recently braid groups have been suggested as an alternate platform for doing public-
key cryptography. The birthdate of braid group based cryptography can be traced
back to the pioneering work of Anshel et al. in 1999 [2] and Ko et al. in 2000 [16].
Since then, braid groups attracted the attention of many cryptographers due to the
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fact that, they provide a rich collection of hard problems like the conjugacy problem,
braid decomposition problem and root problem and there are efficient algorithms for
parameter generation and group operation [4].
Since the construction of a Diffie-Hellman type key agreement protocol and a
public key encryption scheme by Ko et al. in 2000 [16], there have been many
attempts to design other cryptographic protocols using braid groups. Positive results
in this direction are construction of a pseudorandom number generator by Lee et al.
in 2001 [19], key agreement protocols by Anshel et al. in 2001 [1], an implementation
of braid computations by Cha et al. in 2001 [4], digital signature schemes by Ko et
al. in 2002 [15], entity authentication schemes by Sibert et al. in 2002 [23] and a
provably-secure identification scheme by Kim et al. in 2004 [14].
In this paper, we construct some undeniable signature schemes using braid
groups. Digital signatures bind signers to the contents of the document they sign.
The ability for a third party to verify the validity of a signature is usually seen as
the basis for the non-repudiation aspect of digital signatures. The authenticity of
a digital signature can be verified by anyone having the public key of the signer.
However, this universal verifiability property of digital signatures is not always a
desirable property. Such is the case of a signature binding parties to a confidential
agreement, or of a signature on documents carrying private or personal information.
Chaum and van Antwerpen [6] introduced the concept of undeniable signatures
for limiting the ability of third parties to verify the validity of a signature. An
undeniable signature, like digital signature depends on the signer’s public key as
well as on the message signed. Such signatures are characterized by the property
that, verification can only be achieved by interacting with the legitimate signer
through a confirmation protocol. On the other hand, the signer can prove a forgery
by engaging in a denial protocol. If the signer does not succeed in denying (in
particular, if it refuses to cooperate) then the signer remains legally bound to the
signature. On the other hand the signer is protected by the fact that his signature
cannot be verified by unauthorized third parties without his own cooperation.
Undeniable signatures have got immense real life applications. Almost all the
undeniable signature schemes constructed so far have been based on integer factor-
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ization [10] and discrete logarithm problems [6], [5]. Our work is the first to present
undeniable signature schemes based on braid groups or even in any nonabelian group
setting. The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the construction of efficient cryp-
tographic protocols based on hard problems in braid groups. Our schemes are based
on the conjugacy search problem, multiple simultaneous conjugacy search problem,
braid decomposition problem and the multiple simultaneous braid decomposition
problem. In Section 2, we briefly review the basics of braid groups. We describe
in Section 3 the preliminaries needed for this paper. A simple undeniable signature
scheme and a modified one is described in Section 4. A zero-knowledge undeni-
able signature scheme is given in Section 5. We prove the completeness, soundness
and zero-knowledgeness (where ever applicable) of the protocols also. The paper
concludes with some general remarks in Section 6.
2 An Overview of Braid Groups
In this section, we briefly describe the basics of braid groups, hard problems in
braid groups. A good introduction to braid groups is [3] and survey articles on
braid cryptography are [17], [7].
2.1 Geometric Interpretation of Braids
A braid group Bn is an infinite non-commutative group arising from geometric braids
composed of n-strands. A braid is obtained by laying down a number of parallel
strands and intertwining them so that they run in the same direction. The number of
strands is called the braid index. Braids have the following geometric interpretation:
an n-braid (where n ∈ N) is a set of disjoint n strands all of which are attached
to two horizontal bars at the top and bottom such that each strand always heads
downwards as one moves along the strand from top to bottom. Two braids are
equivalent if one can be deformed to the other continuously in the set of braids.
Let Bn be the set of all n-braids. Bn has a natural group structure. Each Bn is
an infinite torsion-free noncommutative group and its elements are called n-braids.
The multiplication ab of two braids a and b is the braid obtained by positioning a
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on the top of b. The identity e is the braid consisting of n straight vertical strands
and the inverse of a is the reflection of a with respect to a horizontal line.
Let Sn be the symmetric group on n symbols. Given a braid α, the strands
define a map p(α) from the top set of endpoints to the bottom set of endpoints. In
this way we get a homomorphism p : Bn → Sn.
2.2 Presentations of Braid Groups
Any braid can be decomposed as a product of simple braids known as Artin gener-
ators σi, that have a single crossing between the i
th strand and the (i+ 1)th strand
with the convention that the ith strand crosses under the (i + 1)th strand. The
homomorphism, p maps the generator σi to the transposition τi (= (i, i+ 1)).
For each integer n ≥ 2, the n-braid group Bn has the Artin presentation by
generators σ1, σ2, . . . , σn−1 with relations
σiσj = σjσi, where |i− j| ≥ 2, and
σiσi+1σi = σi+1σiσi+1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 2.
(2.2.1)
2.3 Some Special Classes of Braids
Let B+n denote the submonoid of Bn generated by {σ1, . . . , σn−1}. Elements of B
+
n
are called the positive braids. A positive braid is characterized by the fact that at
each crossing the string going from left to right undercrosses the string going from
right to left.
A positive braid is called non-repeating if any two of its strands cross at most
once. We denote D = Dn ⊂ B
+
n to be the set of all non-repeating braids. To each
pi ∈ Sn we can associate a unique α ∈ Dn in the following way : for i = 1, . . . , n
connect the upper i-th point to the lower pi(i)-th point by a straight line making
each crossing positive, i.e. the line between i and pi(i) is under the line between j
and pi(j) if i < j. The following lemma says that p restricted to Dn is a bijection.
Lemma 2.1. [9] The homomorphism p : Bn → Sn restricted to Dn is a bijection.
Hence non-repeating braids are also known as permutation braids. From this
lemma it follows that |Dn| = n!. In this way we can identify Dn with Sn .
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Let LBn and RBn be two subgroups of Bn consisting of braids obtained by
braiding left ⌊n
2
⌋ strands and right n− ⌊n
2
⌋ strands, respectively. That is,
LBn = 〈σ1, . . . , σ⌊n
2
⌋−1〉, and RBn = 〈σ⌊n
2
⌋+1, . . . , σn−1〉.
Then we have the commutativity property that for any α ∈ LBn and β ∈ RBn,
αβ = βα. These subgroups of Bn are used in designing various cryptographic
protocols.
2.4 Canonical Decomposition of Braids
For two words v and w in Bn, we say that v ≤ w, if w = avb for some a, b ∈ B
+
n .
Then ≤ is a partial order in Bn [9].
The positive braid, ∆ = (σ1 . . . σn−1)(σ1 . . . σn−2) . . . (σ1σ2)σ1 is called the fun-
damental braid. A braid satisfying e ≤ A ≤ ∆ is called a canonical factor. There
is a bijection between the set of all permutation braids and the set of all canonical
factors [9]. Thus a canonical factor can be denoted by the corresponding permuta-
tion pi ∈ Sn. By pi∆, we mean the permutation corresponding to the fundamental
braid ∆.
For a positive braid P , we say that the decomposition P = A0P0 is left-weighted
if A0 is a canonical factor, P0 ≥ e and A0 has the maximal word length among all
such decompositions. A left-weighted decomposition P = A0P0 is unique [4]. A0 is
called the maximal head of P . Any braid x can be uniquely decomposed as
x = ∆uA1A2 . . . Ak, where u ∈ Z, Ai 6= e,∆, is a canonical factor (2.4.1)
and the decomposition AiAi+1 is left-weighted for each 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 [4]. This
unique decomposition is called the left canonical form of x and so it solves the word
problem. Since each canonical factor corresponds to a permutation braid, x can be
denoted as
x = piufpi1pi2 . . . pik, where pii 6= Identity, pif . (2.4.2)
Hence for implementation purposes the braid x can be represented as the tuple
(u, pi1, pi2, . . . , pik). The integer u, denoted by inf(x) is called the infimum of x and
the integer u + k, denoted by sup(x) is called the supremum of x. The canonical
length of x, denoted by len(x), is given by k = sup(x)− inf(x).
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2.5 Hard Problems in Braid Groups
We use the following hard problems in our signature schemes.
1. Conjugacy Search Problem (CSP)
Let (x, y) ∈ Bn × Bn, such that y = a
−1xa, where a ∈ Bn or some subgroup
of Bn. The conjugacy search problem is to find a b such that y = b
−1xb.
2. Multiple Simultaneous Conjugacy Search Problem (MSCSP)
Let (x1, a
−1x1a), . . . , (xr, a
−1xra) ∈ Bn×Bn for some a ∈ Bn or some subgroup
of Bn. The multiple simultaneous conjugacy problem is to find a b such that,
b−1x1b = a
−1x1a, . . . , b
−1xrb = a
−1xra.
3. Braid Decomposition Problem (BDP)
Let (x, y) ∈ Bn × Bn, where y = a1xa2 for some (a1, a2) ∈ LBn × LBn. The
braid decomposition problem is to find a pair (b1, b2) ∈ LBn × LBn such that
y = b1xb2.
4. Multiple Simultaneous Braid Decomposition Problem (MSBDP)
Let (x1, a1x1a2), . . . , (xr, a1xra2) ∈ Bn × Bn for some (a1, a2) ∈ LBn × LBn.
Themultiple simultaneous braid decomposition problem is to find a pair (b1, b2) ∈
LBn × LBn such that, b1x1b2 = a1x1a2, . . . , b1xrb2 = a1xra2.
3 Preliminaries
In this section, we describe the initial system set up, intractability assumptions, an
assumption regarding the cardinalities of certain sets and some notation used in this
paper are described.
3.1 Initial Setup
The system parameters n and l are chosen to be sufficiently large positive integers
and are made public. Let H : {0, 1}∗ → Bn and h : Bn → {0, 1}
k be collision free
hash functions.
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Since the braid group Bn is discrete and infinite, we cannot have a uniform
probability distribution on Bn. But there are finitely many positive n-braids with l
canonical factors, we may consider randomness for these braids. Such a braid can
be generated by concatenating l random canonical factors.
We fix positive integers n, l as system parameters. Let
Bn(l) = {b ∈ Bn | 0 ≤ inf(b) ≤ sup(b) ≤ l},
LBn(l) = {b ∈ LBn | 0 ≤ inf(b) ≤ sup(b) ≤ l} and
RBn(l) = {b ∈ RBn | 0 ≤ inf(b) ≤ sup(b) ≤ l}.
Then |Bn(l)| ≤ l(n!)
l and so LBn(l), RBn(l) and Bn(l) are finite sets. We use the
random braid generator given in [4] (which produces random braids in O(ln) time)
for generating random braids. Also, we consider uniform probability distribution on
these sets.
By, SRBp we mean some subgroup of RBm, where p < m− ⌊
m
2
⌋ and
SRBp(l) = {b ∈ SRBp | 0 ≤ inf(b) ≤ sup(b) ≤ l}.
3.2 Notations
We use the following notations through out this paper.
• By a ∈r A, we mean a random choice of an element a from the set A.
• By P
Q
−→ V , we mean P sends Q to V .
3.3 Intractability Assumptions
We assume that the hard problems CSP, MSCSP, BDP, MSBDP, stated in Section
2.5 are intractable in braid groups.
3.4 An Assumption on the Cardinality of a Set
We assume that for ‘sufficiently large’ values of n and l and random choices of
α, β, γ ∈ Bn(l), a1, a2 ∈ LBn(l) and a ∈ RBn(l), the cardinality of the set Ea(β, γ)
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defined by
Ea(β, γ) = {e ∈ RBn(l) : e
−1β(a1αa2)e = a
−1β(a1αa2)a, e
−1γαe 6= a−1γαa}
is ‘sufficiently large’. In this paper, we do not undertake any theoretical or numerical
study to check the validity of this assumption. This assumption is rewritten below
and will be used in the security analysis of some of our protocols.
Assumption 3.1. Let n, l be ‘sufficiently large’ positive integers and α, β, γ ∈r
Bn(l), a1, a2 ∈r LBn(l) and a ∈r RBn(l). Then the cardinality of the set Ea(β, γ) is
bounded below by a nonconstant polynomial function p(n, l) of n and l.
4 A Simple Undeniable Signature Scheme
This section describes a simple undeniable signature scheme based on multiple si-
multaneous braid decomposition problem (MSBDP).
4.1 Public and Private Keys
The system is set up by the signer (Alice) in the following manner: Alice chooses
random braids α ∈ Bn(l) and a1, a2 ∈ LBn(l) and computes x = a1αa2. She sets
her public key as (α, x) and private key as (a1, a2).
We shall denote by PK the tuple (α, x) generated as above.
4.2 Signature Generation
Suppose that Alice wants to sign a message m. She computes Sm = a2ya
−1
1 , where
y = H(m), giving the output pair (m,Sm). We denote by SIG(m), the set of valid
signatures on m.
4.3 The Confirmation Protocol
Here we present a zero-knowledge confirmation protocol. It is carried out by two
players, a prover (P ) and a verifier (V ). The public input to the protocol are the
public key parameters, namely (α, x) ∈ PK and a pair (m, Sˆm). For the case that
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Sˆm is a valid signature of m, P will be able to convince V of this fact, while if the
signature is invalid then no prover (even a computationally unbounded one) will be
able to convince V to the contrary except with a negligible probability.
Signature Confirmation Protocol
Input : Prover: Secret key a1, a2 ∈ LBn(l).
Common: Public key (α, x) ∈ PK, y and alleged Sˆm.
1. V chooses a ∈r RBn(l), computes the challenge Q = a
−1(Sˆmx)a and V
Q
→ P .
2. P chooses b, c ∈r Bn(l), computes the response R = b(a
−1
2 Qa
−1
2 )c and P
R
→ V .
3. V
a
−→ P .
4. P verifies that Q = a−1(Sˆmx)a and then P
(b,c)
−→ V .
5. V verifies that R = ba−1(yα)ac. If it holds then V accepts Sˆm as a valid
signature of P .
Theorem 4.1. Confirmation Theorem. Let (α, x) ∈ PK.
Completeness: Given Sm ∈ SIG(m), if P follows the signature confirmation pro-
tocol then V always accepts Sm as a valid signature.
Soundness: A Cheating prover P ∗ even computationally unbounded cannot con-
vince V to accept Sˆm /∈ SIG(m) with probability greater than
1
p(n,l)
.
Zero-knowledgeness: The protocol is zero-knowledge, namely on input of a mes-
sage and its valid signature, any (possibly cheating) verifier V ∗ interacting with the
prover P does not learn any information aside from the validity of the signature.
Proof. Completeness: Let Sm be a valid signature. P computes
R = b(a−12 Qa
−1
2 )c = b(a
−1
2 a
−1(Sˆmx)aa
−1
2 )c = ba
−1(yα)ac.
which V verifies after getting (b, c) from P and accepts the signature as valid. Hence
the protocol is complete.
Soundness: By Assumption 3.1, there are at least p(n, l) choices for a ∈ RBn(l),
which give the same value of Q but giving different values of R. Hence it is infeasible
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for a cheating prover P ∗ to distinguish between these different values of a, even if
he has infinite computational power. Therefore a cheating prover P ∗, even compu-
tationally unbounded, cannot convince V to accept Sˆm /∈ SIG(m) with probability
greater than 1
p(n,l)
. Thus the protocol is sound.
Zero-knowledgeness: There are two difficulties in the analysis here. Since Bn is
an infinite discrete group, we can not have a uniform probability distribution on Bn.
Also, for the implementation purpose we need to restrict to a finite subset Bn(l) of
Bn. Unfortunately Bn has no finite nontrivial subgroup. So at some computational
stages in the protocol, the elements may fall out of Bn(l). Hence we only give a
sketch of the proof here.
For the ease of analysis let us assume that at Step 2, P chooses (b, c) ∈r B
2
n
and computes R ∈ Bn. So, we can treat R as a random element of Bn. Also since
|Bn(l)| ≥ (⌊
n−1
2
⌋!)l [16], any random choice of (b, c) ∈ Bn(l)
2 by P in practice makes
the response R to appear as a random element. Hence the protocol can be treated
as zero-knowledgeable.
4.4 Signature Denial Protocol
The public input to the protocol are the public key parameters, namely (α, x) ∈ PK
and a pair (m, Sˆm). In the case that Sˆm /∈ SIG(m), P will be able to convince
V of this fact, while if Sˆm ∈ SIG(m) then no prover (even a computationally
unbounded) will be able to convince V that the signature is invalid except with
negligible probability.
Let SRBn1 and SRBn2 be two subgroups of RBn consisting of braids obtained by
braiding left n1 strands and right n2 strands, respectively (where n1+n2 = n−⌊
n
2
⌋).
Then we have the commutativity property that for any σ ∈ SRBn1 and τ ∈ SRBn2,
στ = τσ.
The Denial Protocol
Input : Prover: Secret key a1, a2 ∈ LBn(l).
Common: Public key (α, x) ∈ PK, y and alleged Sˆm.
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1. V chooses a ∈r SRBn1(l), b ∈r SRBn2(l), computes Q1 = a
−1Sˆmxa,
Q2 = b
−1Sˆmxb and V
(Q1,Q2)
−→ P .
2. P computes the responses R1 = a
−1
2 Q1a
−1
2 , R2 = a
−1
2 Q2a
−1
2 and P
(R1,R2)
−→ V .
3. V verifies b−1R1b = a
−1R2a. If equality holds V accepts Sˆm as an invalid
signature, else P is answering improperly.
Theorem 4.2. Denial Theorem Let (α, x) ∈ PK
Completeness: Suppose that Sˆm /∈ SIG(m). If P and V follow the protocol, then
V always accepts that Sˆm is not a valid signature of m.
Soundness: Suppose that Sˆm ∈ SIG(m). Then a cheating prover, even computa-
tionally unbounded, cannot convince V to reject the signature with probability greater
than 1
p(n,l)
.
Proof. Completeness: Assume that Sˆm /∈ SIG(m). We have,
R1 = a
−1
2 a
−1Sˆmxaa
−1
2 = a
−1a−12 Sˆma1αa and
R2 = a
−1
2 b
−1Sˆmxba
−1
2 = b
−1a−12 Sˆma1αb.
As ab = ba, we get,
b−1R1b = a
−1R2a = a
−1b−1(a2Sˆma1α)ba.
Hence the protocol is complete.
Soundness: Assume that Sˆm ∈ SIG(m). Let R1 and R2 be the responses given by
P ∗ in the protocol. Let if possible, b−1R1b = a
−1R2a. Then
R2 = a(b
−1R1b)a
−1 = aβa−1, where β = b−1R1b.
In the worst case, we may regard β as a known constant for P when he tries to
determine R2. But then the ability to determine R2 amounts to the establishment of
an invalid signature, which contradicts Theorem 4.1 (soundness of the confirmation
protocol). Hence the protocol is sound.
4.5 A Blackmailing Attack
In this subsection, we show that any non zero-knowledge version of the confirmation
protocol is susceptible to a blackmailing attack. That is, if the prover does not
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check the challenge Q of the verifier, he is susceptible to a black mailing attack.
This type of attack for the discrete logarithm based undeniable signature schemes
was suggested by M. Jakobsson [12]. M. Jakobsson noted that the protocol in [6]
has the following weakness that Alice proving the correctness of her signatures never
knows what signature is being verified. Using these weaknesses of the undeniable
signatures he showed that how an adversary can blackmail a signer.
For illustrating this attack in our case, we consider the following non-zero knowl-
edge version of the confirmation protocol given in Section 4.3.
Signature Confirmation Protocol
Input : Prover: Secret key a1, a2 ∈ LBn(l).
Common: Public key (α, x) ∈ PK, y and alleged Sˆm.
1. V chooses a ∈r RBn(l), computes the challenge Q = a
−1(Sˆmx)a and V
Q
→ P .
2. P computes the response R = a−12 Qa
−1
2 and P
R
→ V .
3. V verifies that R = a−1(yα)a. If it holds, V accepts Sˆm as a valid signature
of P .
Now, suppose that Eve has found out that (m,Sm) belongs to Alice (Eve might be
Bob itself). Now we will show, how Eve can convince k entities E1, E2, . . . , Ek that
the signature pair belongs to Alice.
Let SRBn0 , SRBn1, . . . , SRBnk be k + 1 subgroups of the n-braid group RBn,
where n−⌊n
2
⌋ = n0+n1+. . .+nk, for some appropriate positive integers n0, n1, . . . , nk.
Each SRBni is the subgroup of RBn consisting of braids made by braiding ni-strands
from the left among n−⌊n
2
⌋ strands with the order n0, n1, . . . , nk. Let n−1 = 1. Then
for i = 0, 1, . . . , k,
SRBni = 〈σli+1, σli+2, . . . , σli+ni−1〉, where li = ⌊
n
2
⌋ +
i−1∑
j=0
nj
and we have the mutual commutativity property that for any αi ∈ SRBni and
αj ∈ SRBnj with i 6= j, αiαj = αjαi.
The Protocol
1. Eve asks each {Ei}
k
i=1 to choose secret braids ai ∈ SRBni(l) .
2. Eve chooses a secret braid a0 ∈ RBn0(l) and computes Q0 = a
−1
0 Smxa0.
3. Eve
Q0
−→ E1
Q1
−→ E2
Q2
−→. . .
Qk−1
−→ Ek
Qk−→ Eve, where Qi = a
−1
i Qi−1ai,
for i = 1, . . . k.
4. Eve convinces Alice to engage in a confirmation protocol for a message pair
(mˆ, Smˆ).
5. Eve
Qk→ Alice.
6. Alice computes the response R = a−12 Qka
−1
2 and Alice
R
→ Eve.
7. Eve
(Qk,R,m)
−→ Ei, for i = 1, . . . k.
8. Ei
ai−→ Eve, for i = 1, . . . k.
9. Eve computes a =
k∏
i=0
ai and Eve
a
−→ Ei, for i = 1, . . . k.
10. Each Ei checks whether Qk = a
−1Smxa and R = a
−1yαa. If it holds they will
be convinced that Alice signed the message m.
Theorem 4.3. If Eve sends out (a, R,Qk, m) to {Ei}
k
i=1, each one of them will be
able to convince himself that the signature belongs to Alice.
Proof. By Assumption 3.1, it follows that Eve can not get {ai}
k
i=1 from Qk before
committing (Qk, R,m) to {Ei}
k
i=1, since each ai is a random braid chosen and kept
secret by Ei. By checking Qk = a
−1Smxa, each Ei will be convinced that Eve has not
cheated them by forming the challenge Q0 corresponding to some other signer.
4.6 Blinding
The above signature scheme is a deterministic signature scheme whose security is
based on the hardness of MSBDP. MSBDP may become easier as the number of
13
available braid pairs increases. In our case, the parameter r in MSBDP is the num-
ber of messages signed. So to make the scheme more secure, we may modify the
scheme by blinding the signatures using random braids. The modified scheme can
be described as follows.
Signature Generation
To generate a signature on a message m the signer proceeds in the following way.
1. Signer chooses r ∈r LBn(l).
2. Computes Sm = ra2ya
−1
1 , where y = H(m).
3. Outputs the signature (m,Sm).
The confirmation and denial protocols are exactly similar to the protocols given in
the earlier case. A non zero-knowledge version of the confirmation protocol is given
below for an illustration.
The Confirmation Protocol
Input : Prover: Secret key a1, a2 ∈ LBn(l), and blinding factor r ∈r LBn(l).
Common: Public key (α, x) ∈ PK, y, and alleged Sˆm.
1. V chooses a ∈ RBn(l) computes the challenge Q = a
−1Sˆmxa and V
Q
→ P .
2. P computes the response R = a−12 r
−1Qa−12 and P
R
→ V .
3. V verifies that R = a−1yαa. If equality holds then V accepts Sˆm as the
signature of P .
Remark 4.1. We can easily see that the confirmation theorem and the denial the-
orem hold in this case also.
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5 A Zero-knowledge Undeniable Signature Scheme
In this section, we describe an undeniable signature scheme in which the denial
protocol is also zero-knowledge.
5.1 Public and Private Keys
The system is set up by the signer (Alice) in the following manner: Alice chooses
α ∈r Bn(l) and a1, a2 ∈r LBn(l) and computes x = a1αa2. She sets her public key
as (α, x) and the private key as (a1, a2).
We shall denote by PK, the tuples (α, x) generated as above.
5.2 Signature Generation
Suppose that Alice wants to sign a message m. She computes Sm = a1ya
−1
1 , where
y = H(m), giving the output pair (m,Sm).
We denote by SIG(m), the set of valid signatures on m.
5.3 The Confirmation Protocol
The confirmation protocol in this case is exactly similar to the protocol given in
Section 4.3.
5.4 Denial Protocol
Here we describe a zero-knowledge denial protocol. The public input to the protocol
are the public key parameters, namely (α, x) ∈ PK and a pair (m, Sˆm).
In this protocol, we use a zero-knowledge commitment function called blob.
blob(r, t) perfectly hides the value of t as long as r is secret and once the value
of r is revealed one can open the blob and get the value of t.
Signature Denial Protocol
Input : Prover : Secret key a1, a2 ∈ LBn(l).
Common: Public key (α, x) ∈ PK, y and alleged Sˆm.
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1. V chooses a ∈r RBn(l) and t ∈r {1, 2, . . . , k}, computes
Q = (yta−1αa, Sˆtma
−1xa) = (Q1, Q2) and V
Q
→ P .
2. P computes t by trial and error using Q2/a1Q1a2 = (Sˆm/s
−1ys)t.
Also, P chooses r randomly and P
blob(r,t)
−→ V.
3. V
a
→ P .
4. P checks the value of Q using a and then P
r
→ V .
5. V opens the blob using the value of r and checks the value of t. If the value of
t committed by P is correct, then V accepts that Sˆm is not a valid signature
of P .
Remark 5.1. The value of k in Step 1 above depends on the computing power of
the prover and the verifier. If the prover has low computing power, the value of k
can be chosen to be small but then the protocol needs to be repeated.
Theorem 5.1. Denial Theorem Let (α, x) ∈ PK.
Completeness: If Sˆm /∈ SIG(m) and if P and V follow the protocol, then V always
accepts that Sˆm is not a valid signature of m.
Soundness: Assuming that Sˆm ∈ SIG(m), then a cheating prover, even compu-
tationally unbounded, can not convince V to reject Sˆm with probability greater than
1/k.
Zero-knowledgeness: The protocol is zero-knowledge, namely, on input of a mes-
sage and a non valid signature, any (possibly cheating) verifier V ∗ interacting with
the prover P does not learn any information aside from the fact that Sˆm is in fact
not a valid signature for the message m.
Proof. Completeness: Upon receiving Q from V , P computes
Q2/a1Q1a2 = ((Sˆm)
ta−1xa)/(a1y
ta−11 )(a1a
−1αaa2)
= ((Sˆm)
ta−1xa)/(a1y
ta−11 )(a
−1xa)
= (Sˆm/a1ya
−1
1 )
t 6= e.
Since (Q2/a1Q1a2) and (Sˆm/a1ya
−1
1 ) are known to P , P can compute the value of t
by trial and error as the value of t is small.
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Soundness: a hides t in the challenge Q. Since the value committed to by the
blob cannot be changed, P ’s best strategy is to guess the value of t, and there are
k choices for t. Hence the protocol is sound.
Zero-knowledgeness: This follows immediately from the zero-knowledge commit-
ment of the blob.
Remark 5.2. The above signature scheme is a deterministic signature scheme whose
security is based on the hardness of MSCSP. As in the case of MSBDP, MSCSP
may become easier as the number of available conjugate pairs increases. Hence the
scheme may be made more secure by blinding the signatures using random braids as
described in Section 4.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we constructed some undeniable signature schemes using braid groups.
Some of these schemes enjoy the zero-knowledge property. We used braid groups
for the first time for designing undeniable signatures. The security of our schemes
are based on the hardness of CSP, MSCSP, BDP and MSBDP. One can also explore
the possibility of employing other hard problems for designing these protocols.
In Step 1 of the confirmation protocol given in Section 4.3, V may compute
the challenge Q as aSˆmxb or a
−1Sˆmab
−1xb or aSˆmbxc instead of a
−1Sˆmxa, where
a, b, c ∈ RBn(l). The advantage with this modification is that there can be more
choices, for a, b, c ∈ RBn(l) which give the same value of Q but giving different
values of R. This makes the task of a cheating prover P ∗ to guess the value of R
harder, which in turn makes the probability for a cheating prover P ∗ to convince V
to accept Sˆm /∈ SIG(m) smaller. The denial protocol given in Section 4.4 can also
be similarly modified.
In this paper we have not carried out any investigation regarding the validity
of the Assumption 3.1. We leave this problem for future investigation. Getting
a theoretical justification for this assumption appears to be too hard. However,
numerical experiments might throw some light on this assumption.
There are many desirable features for a good undeniable signatures like con-
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vertibility (the possibility to transform undeniable signatures into regular ones),
delegation (enabling selected third parties to confirm/deny signatures but not to
sign). We have not considered these problems in this paper. Hence we hope that
this study will motivate further research on digital signature schemes based on braid
group as well as other nonabelian groups.
The birth of braid cryptography has stimulated the search for other exotic math-
ematical structures for doing public-key cryptography. The public-key cryptography
has been treated under the head of number theory and finite fields only. With the
birth of braid cryptography a broader perspective on public-key cryptography has
emerged. People have started looking at other nonabelian groups [25], [24], [20], [11]
and combinatorial groups [22], [21] for building public-key cryptosystems. Hence
we hope that this study will further stimulate the search for other mathematical
structures as a better alternative to the number theoretic and discrete log based
cryptosystems.
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